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BRIEF STATEMENT SHOWING THE JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
Jurisdiction of this court is conferred by § 78-2(a)-3(2)(h) and (j), Utah Code Ann. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the court err in finding: 
a. That the Decree of Divorce awarded the two subject parcels of 
real property to the plaintiff. 
b. That the defendant had negotiated in bad faith. 
c. That there was no testimony or other evidence that contradicted 
the testimony given by the plaintiff regarding the real property that is the subject matter of 
this appeal. 
Standard of Review: The findings will be upheld unless the court determines that the 
findings are clearly erroneous. Katzenberger v. State, 735 P.2d 405 (Utah App. 1987). 
2. Whether the court abused it discretion in awarding attorney's fees to 
the plaintiff. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 
1993). 
3. Whether the court made sufficient findings to support its finding that 
there was a marital interest in the subject property. 
1 
Standard of Review: Whether the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and 
capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment. Atkins v. Deliran, 131 P.2d 
966 (Utah 1987). 
4. Whether the court committed error in granting the plaintiffs Verified 
Petition for Modification. 
Standard of Review: Whether the court's decision as to modification constituted an 
abuse of discretion. Hinckley v. Hinckley, 815 P.2d 1352 (Utah App. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. 
This appeal is from the Judgment and Order dated March 29, 1996 of the Third 
Judicial District Court, the Honorable William H. Bohling presiding, which granted the 
plaintiffs Verified Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
1. The parties to this appeal were husband and wife, having married on 
April 25, 1974. 
2. The plaintiff filed his Complaint for Divorce on or about July 6, 1990. 
3. On or about August 27, 1990, the parties appeared before The 
Honorable Domestic Relations Commissioner, Michael S. Evans, on the Defendant's Motion 
for Order to Show Cause. At that time the parties stipulated that they should be restrained 
from jeopardizing marital assets. 
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4. The divorce was to be heard on July 2, 1991. On July 2, 1991, the 
parties pursued negotiations that resulted in a stipulation. One of the issues was whether 
there was a marital interest in two parcels of real property located in North Salt Lake. 
During those negotiations, it was the defendant's position that there was no marital interest, 
and had been no marital or individual interest in the two parcels of real property, and that 
the defendant's name had been placed on the title along with the defendant's mother in 
order to protect her father. Regarding the pieces of property, the parties agreed that 
whatever interest the defendant had in those properties, either individually or as marital 
property, as of July 6, 1990 would be awarded to the plaintiff. The stipulation that was read 
into the record by the defendant's counsel referred to the two parcels as follows: 
There was some other property which, of course, the defendant has 
claimed was not marital property. It is our agreement that if it should be 
determined that there is a marital interest in the property other than the 10.7 
acres and the residential property that it would go completely to the plaintiff 
free and clear of any interest of the defendant. (Transcript of 7/2/91, p. 2, 
11. 24, 25; p. 3, 11. 1-5). 
5. Plaintiff counsel was given an opportunity to clarify or make any 
additions to the Stipulation that was read into the record. Regarding the two parcels of real 
property that are the subject of this appeal, the defendant's counsel stated: 
There are in our view, Judge, two pieces of real property and I want 
to be clear on this one point, two pieces of property in addition to the 10.7 
acres in North Salt Lake and the marital residence, which my client claims 
there is an interest either in himself, the two of them, or in the defendant by 
herself, and it's the agreement between the parties that whatever interest she 
may have in reference to both the individual capacity or as a marital estate, 
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would be conveyed to my client, if any. (Transcript of 7/2/91, p. 4,1. 25; p. 5, 
11. 1-9). 
6. On or about July 7, 1993, the plaintiff filed a Verified Petition to 
Modify the Decree of Divorce. The plaintiff alleged in the Petition to Modify that 
"notwithstanding the express court order prohibiting the defendant from selling the property, 
as well as the express agreement made and entered into in open court, the defendant has 
sold the same and taken the benefits of the same as her sole and separate property." 
7. On or about November 4, 1990 the defendant answered the Verified 
Petition to Modify. As an affirmative defense, the defendant stated that, "The plaintiffs 
Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce fails to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted." 
8. On January 9, 1995, the Verified Petition for Modifying the Decree of 
Divorce came on for trial. Among other findings not material to this appeal, the court made 
the following findings that are pertinent to the appeal: 
a. That pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, prepared by Mr. Harry 
Caston of McKay, Burton and Thurman, Attorneys for Defendant, the plaintiff David 
Costanzo, was awarded two parcels of property, one of 3.1 acres and another of 3.47 acres 
in North Salt Lake, and the defendant was awarded a single parcel of 10.7 acres in North 
Salt Lake. (Findings of Fact, 112). 
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b. That sometime in the month of April, 1991, the defendant signed 
two warranty deeds conveying her interest in the two parcels awarded to plaintiff, referred 
to in paragraph #2 above, to the defendant's mother and sister, without either disclosing the 
same to plaintiff or otherwise obtaining authorization from the Court. (Findings of Fact, 117). 
c. That the parties stipulated to the appraisal prepared by Jerry 
Webber, as being admitted into evidence, which showed the fair market value of the said 
two parcels in 1994 to be $105,200.00. (Findings of Fact, 118). 
d. That the defendant testified while on the stand during cross 
examination that her original pleadings stated that the property in North Salt Lake, should 
be awarded to the plaintiff and that she be awarded one-half of the value of the same, with 
no mention that the property did not belong to the parties. (Findings of Fact, 119). 
e. That the defendant testified while on the stand during cross 
examination that her affidavit filed as the Financial Declaration of the defendant, that the 
property in North Salt Lake, should be awarded to the plaintiff and that she be awarded 
one-half of the value of the same, with no mention that the property did not belong to the 
parties. (Findings of Fact, 1110). 
f. That the statements made by the defendant that the parties had 
no interest in the said property, is inconsistent with the pleadings filed by the defendant, and 
inconsistent with the affidavit filed by the defendant, prior to the granting of the subject 
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divorce, and therefore the Court does not find her testimony regarding the parties interest 
in the subject property to be credible. (Findings of Fact, 1111) 
g. That there was no testimony or other evidence that contradicted 
the testimony given by the plaintiff, regarding the parties interest, and therefore the court 
finds as a matter of law that the 3.1 acres and the 3.47 acres in North Salt Lake to be 
marital property, awarded to the plaintiff in the subject Decree of Divorce. (Findings of 
Fact, 1112). 
h. That by virtue of the foregoing the defendant did not negotiate 
in good faith when she agreed that the plaintiff would be entitled to the 3.1 acres and the 
3.47 acres in the North Salt lake, as of the time of filing of the complaint for divorce, when 
she had already transferred the said parcels in April of 1991. (Findings of Fact, 1114). 
i. That the defendant agreed to transfer the parties interest in the 
said two parcels as existed in July, 1990, without disclosing to the plaintiff, his counsel, 
defendant counsel nor the Court that she had already transferred all of the parties interest 
two months earlier, to defendant's mother and sister in violation of the restraining order that 
she sought and obtained from the court, in August of 1990. (Findings of Fact, 1115). 
j . That the negotiations by the defendant were therefore not only 
in bad faith, but that the transfer of the subject property to be in direct violation of the 
restraining order obtained by the defendant. (Findings of Fact, 1116). 
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k. That the fair market value of the two parcels of property, of 3.1 
acres and 3.47 acres to be $105,200.00. (Findings of Fact, 1117). 
1. That the pawning of the shot guns and the transfer of the two 
parcels of property to be in direct violation of the restraining order of this Court, and 
therefore the plaintiff is entitled to judgment of $106,200.00 as well as a reasonable 
attorneys fee. (Findings of Fact, 1118). 
9. Based on those Findings, the Court granted the plaintiff judgment in 
the amount of $106,200.00, costs in the sum of $769.75 and a reasonable attorneys fee of 
$5,150.00, all to bear interest at the maximum legal rate until paid. 
10. The defendant objected to the proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, particularly paragraph 2 as not accurately setting forth the terms of the 
Decree of Divorce regarding the parties' real property; and the statement of paragraph 12 
of the Findings of Fact that there was no testimony or other evidence that contradicted the 
testimony given by the plaintiff regarding the parties' interest in the real property. The 
Court denied the defendant's objections to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
which were entered by the Court on March 29, 1996. 
11. The defendant marshals the following evidence that would support the 
Findings of Fact that are challenged in this appeal: 
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a. The testimony of the plaintiff that prior to the time the parties 
appeared before the court for the hearing on the divorce, July 2, 1991, the defendant owned 
the 3.1 acre parcel (TT, p. 53, 11. 23-25). 
b. That the plaintiff testified that the basis of his ownership in the 
3.1 acres was that in 1983 and 1984 Perry Vincent was having problems with the IRS, that 
the IRS was going to take Perry Vincent's home and that he and Perry Vincent negotiated 
a project in Wyoming and that David Costanzo gave Perry Vincent $13,000.00 when the job 
was over (TT p. 54,11. 1-19). 
c. That the plaintiff testified that as a result of the aforementioned 
payments, the property was really paid one-half by himself and one-half by Perry Vincent 
(TT p. 54, 11. 23-25, p. 55, 1. 1). 
d. That the plaintiff testified that when he and Perry Vincent split 
in February or March of 1983, he reached an arrangement by which he and the defendant 
would pay for the 3.47 acres and that Perry Vincent and his wife, Diane Vincent, would be 
responsible for the payments on the 10.7 acres (TT p. 61, 11. 11-25). 
e. That the plaintiff testified that he owned both parcels of real 
property even though his name did not appear on any of the Deeds (TT p. 78, 11. 11-15). 
f. That the plaintiff testified that as far as the subject properties 
were concerned, the ownership was not reflected by the names appearing on the respective 
Deeds (TT p. 80, 11. 9-17). 
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g. That the plaintiff testified that the 3.1 acres was deeded to him 
through the defendant (TT p. 116, 11. 24-25). 
h. That he had an arrangement with Perry Vincent that if Perry 
would pay for a parcel of 10.7 acres, the plaintiff would pay for the 3.47 acres (TT p. 125, 
11. 22-25). 
1 That the plaintiff testified that he owned 100% of the 3.1 acres 
"because there was a lot of time that Shauna and I gave money to Perry." (TT p. 126,11. 21-
25). 
j . That the plaintiff testified that the 3.1 acres was a set-off against 
what he contributed to Perry Vincent's judgments. (TT p. 127, 11. 15-19). 
k. That under cross-examination the defendant testified that 
paragraph 7 of the Answer and Counterclaim states that "during the marriage the parties 
acquired an interest in real property located in North Salt Lake. Plaintiff should be 
awarded the entire interest subject to paying defendant one-half of the value of said interest, 
which is to take place no later than 30 days following the entry of the Decree of Divorce." 
(TT p. 141, 11. 23-25, p. 142, 11. 1-5). 
1. That in the Financial Declaration the defendant requested that 
"plaintiff should be awarded real property located in North Salt Lake, Utah subject to the 
plaintiff paying defendant one-half the value of said interest, which is to take place no later 
than two or three days following the entry of the Decree of Divorce." (TT p. 143,11. 11-16). 
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12. That the following evidence supports the arguments made in this 
appeal: 
a. The defendant's testimony that she did not remember how or 
when the two pieces of real property were acquired (TT p. 28, 11. 6-12). 
b. The defendant's testimony that her understanding was that the 
two parcels were purchased by her father, Perry Vincent, and that he had asked her to "sign 
with my mom on the property." (TT p. 28, 1. 17). 
c. The defendant's testimony that in April of 1991 when the 
defendant transferred her interest in the properties, she had done so at the instruction of 
her father, and that she did not receive any money related to the transfer. (TT p. 38,11. 18-
22). 
d. The defendant's testimony that she did not pay any consideration 
regarding either of the properties. (TT p. 43, 1. 4). 
e. The defendant's testimony that she never discussed with anyone 
what was going to be done with the properties, and wasn't involved in selling and/or 
transferring the properties (TT p. 48-49, 11. 18-19). 
f. The plaintiffs testimony that the 3.1 acres were purchased when 
Perry Vincent returned from Kentucky (TT p. 51, 11. 24, 25; p. 52, 11. 15-23). 
g. The plaintiffs testimony that Perry Vincent negotiated with the 
seller for the purchase of the 3.1 acre property (TT p. 52, 11. 22, 23). 
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h. The plaintiffs testimony that Perry Vincent paid the down 
payment on the 3.1 acre property (TT p. 53; 11. 1, 2). 
i. The plaintiffs testimony that the balance of the payments for 
the purchase of the 3.1 acre property was made from Perry Vincent and his sand-blasting 
company (TT p. 53, 11. 16-20). 
j . The plaintiffs testimony that as a result of the payments made 
by the sand-blasting company, the payments on the 3.1 acre property were made one-half 
by Perry Vincent, and one-half by the plaintiff (TT p. 54, 11. 23-25; p. 55, 1. 1). 
k. The plaintiffs testimony that Shauna Costanzo did not 
participate in transactions regarding the property (TT p. 56, 11. 15-17). 
1. The plaintiffs testimony that the defendant did not know what 
property she had; that she was not kept abreast of the status of the properties; and that in 
July of 1991 when the parties reached their agreement, the defendant did not know what 
interest she had in the subject pieces of real property (TT p. 57, 11. 5-19). 
m. The plaintiffs testimony regarding the 3.47 acres that the 
defendant and her mother had signed the Uniform Real Estate Contract and the Warranty 
Deed on behalf of the defendant and Perry Vincent (TT p. 59, 11. 12-14). 
n. The plaintiffs testimony that a corporation, the name of which 
he could not recall, tendered the down payment on the 3.47 acre property (TT p. 15,11. 12-
24). 
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o. The plaintiffs testimony that the reason neither of the properties 
had been put in his and Perry Vincent's names was to protect Perry Vincent (TT p. 62, 11. 
3,4). 
p. The plaintiffs testimony that Perry Vincent had paid the taxes 
on the 3.1 acre property (TT p. 65, 11. 7-9). 
q. The plaintiffs testimony that he and Perry Vincent were "he 
incorporators of Interwest Sandblasting (TT p. 54, 11. 17, 18). 
r. The plaintiffs testimony that his name did not appear on any 
of the deeds. 
s. The plaintiffs testimony regarding the 3.1 acres: 
(1) That it was purchased on July 17, 1977 (TT p. 81,11. 13-
14). 
(2) That the purchase price was $12,400 (TT p. 82, 1. 3). 
(3) That the down payment was $5,500, and was paid by Perry 
Vincent (TT p. 82, 11. 6-9). 
(4) That the Uniform Real Estate Contract that had been 
entered into by the defendant and her mother on July 26, 1977 provided that when the 
buyers had tendered all of the payments set forth in the Uniform Real Estate Contract, the 
sellers would provide a Warranty Deed (TT p. 83, 11. 13-18; p. 84, 11. 5-6). 
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(5) That the Warranty Deed transferring the property to the 
defendant and Diane Vincent, each with a one-half undivided interest, was executed on 
December 26, 1977 and recorded with the Davis County Recorder on January 9, 1978 (TT 
p. 86, 11. 9-18). 
t. That the 3.47 acre property was purchased in 1978 (TT p. 88, 
11. 18, 19). 
u. That Perry Vincent had an interest in the properties even though 
neither were in his name, but were in his wife's and the defendant's names (TT p. 98,11. 15-
21). 
v. That in February of 1983, the plaintiff started a company known 
as "Western States Coating and Painting" and he needed equipment for that business (TT 
p. 104, 11. 8-16). 
w. That prior to starting out the business was first called Interwest 
Coating and Painting (TT p. 104, 11. 22-23). 
x. That the plaintiff negotiated with Perry Vincent for some 
equipment (TT p. 105, 11. 17-25). 
y. That as part of his negotiation with Perry Vincent, the plaintiff 
was going to pay the sellers on the 3.47 acres (TT 106, 11. 1-5). 
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z. That the sellers of the 3.47 acres, the Larsens, issued a Warranty 
Deed to the defendant and her mother on December 11, 1979, which was recorded on 
December 14, 1979 (TT p. 110, 11. 5-7 and 22-24). 
aa. That during the time the plaintiff was in business with Perry 
Vincent, he and Perry were "pretty much partners, half and half." (TT p. 125,11. 13-17). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
POINT 1. THE FINDING THAT THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AWARDED 
THE TWO SUBJECT PARCELS OF PROPERTY TO THE PLAINTIFF IS 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Summary: One of the issues between the parties was whether there was a marital 
or individual interest in the subject properties, the plaintiff claiming there was an interest 
and the defendant claiming there was no interest. This issue was resolved by the parties 
stipulating that whatever interest the parties, or the defendant individually, had in the said 
properties as of July of 1990 would be awarded to the plaintiff. The stipulation of July 2, 
1991 as clarified by the plaintiffs counsel states: "Consistent with this agreement that the 
plaintiff would be awarded any marital or individual interest in the properties, // any!' 
(emphasis added). 
POINT 2. THE COURTS FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD 
NEGOTIATED IN BAD FAITH IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Summary: The consistent testimony from both the plaintiff and the defendant was 
that from the date the properties were purchased, continuing through the date the parties 
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appeared before the court for the divorce trial, the defendant did not participate in any way 
in the purchase, maintenance, or disposition of the properties; did not know what interest 
she had or did not have; and was acting on behalf of others. As such, the defendant could 
not have negotiated in bad faith regarding those properties. 
POINT 3. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
Summary: The award of attorney's fees was predicated on the court's finding that the 
defendant had acted in bad faith in the negotiations regarding the properties. As even the 
plaintiff claims that the defendant was not aware of what interest she had in those 
properties, and was acting on behalf of others, she could not have been negotiating in bad 
faith. As the defendant could not have been negotiating in bad faith, the award of 
attorney's fees was improper. 
POINT 4. THE FINDING THAT THERE IS NO TESTIMONY OR 
OTHER EVIDENCE THAT CONTRADICTED THE TESTIMONY 
GIVEN BY THE PLAINTIFF REGARDING THE PARTIES' INTEREST 
IN THE 3.1 AND 3.47 ACRE PROPERTIES" IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Summary: For the finding to be correct, there must not have been any testimony or 
other evidence contradicting the plaintiffs testimony that he owned the 3.1 and 3.47 acres. 
The record is replete with testimony and documentary evidence contradicting the plaintiffs 
claim of ownership. Contradictory to the plaintiffs claim that he owned both properties 
outright is his own testimony that Perry Vincent paid the down payment on the 3.1 acre 
property; that at no time did he receive a deed or title to the properties; that corporate 
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entities, not the plaintiff personally, made payments on the other properties; that corporate 
entities operated by he and Perry Vincent paid for the properties; that Perry Vincent paid 
for the properties; that he and Perry Vincent paid for the properties "50-50;" that the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract provided that the Deed to the 3.1 acre property would be 
conveyed when paid; and that the Warranty Deed was issued in December of 1977. 
POINT 5. THE COURTS FINDING THAT THERE WAS A MARITAL 
INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUFFICIENT FINDINGS. 
Summary: There was conflicting and contrary evidence presented at trial regarding 
ownership of the subject properties. The Warranty Deed on the 3.1 acre property was 
executed on December 26, 1977 pursuant to which the defendant and Diane Vincent each 
received a one-half undivided interest in said property. The Warranty Deed on the 3.47 
acre property was conveyed to the defendant and Diane Vincent as joint tenants, not tenants 
in common, with full rights of survivorship, on December 11, 1979. There was no evidence 
supporting the court's finding that there was a marital interest in said properties. Said 
findings might have included (a) whether and/or when these properties were conveyed the 
defendant and/or her mother obtained an interest, and if so, their respective ownership 
interests; (b) whether the court determined that at the time the properties were conveyed, 
that the plaintiff had an interest and if so, what interest; (c) whether at the time the 
properties were conveyed the defendant and/or her mother were acting on behalf of others; 
(d) if the plaintiff obtained an interest after the properties had been conveyed, what that 
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interest was and how it was obtained by him, and whether the interest was obtained by gift 
or through the payments that the plaintiff claimed he made; and (e) why, if as the plaintiff 
testified, he paid for one-half of the properties, the court granted judgment in an amount 
equal to the entire value of the properties. 
As there were no findings explaining how or why the parties acquired a marital 
interest, the bare finding that there was a maiital interest is not sufficiently supported. 
POINT 6. THE COURT EXCEEDED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING 
THE PLAINTIFF'S PETITION TO MODIFY. 
Summary: The ruling from which this appeal is taken is the court's ruling on the 
plaintiffs Verified Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce. As the plaintiff did not allege 
a change in circumstance; as the plaintiff did not even try to set forth a change in 
circumstance at the trial; and as the court did not find a substantial change in circumstance, 
it was error to grant the plaintiffs Petition to Modify. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE FINDING THAT THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AWARDED 
THE TWO SUBJECT PARCELS OF PROPERTY TO THE PLAINTIFF IS 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
On July 2, 1991, the parties appeared before the court for a hearing on the divorce. 
After lengthy negotiations that took place that day, the parties reached a stipulation. That 
stipulation was read into the record by defendant's counsel. Additions and clarifications to 
the stipulation were made by plaintiffs counsel. One of the issues negotiated by the parties 
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was whether the parties had an interest in two parcels of real property located in North Salt 
Lake, one of which consisted of 3.1 acres, and the other which consisted of 3.47 acres. It 
was the defendant's position that she did not have either an individual or marital interest 
in those properties, and that although the 3.1 acre parcel had been conveyed to her and her 
mother, Diane R. Vincent, each with a one-half undivided interest, in December of 1987, 
and that by way of Warranty Deed dated December 11, 1979, she and her mother as joint 
tenants, not as tenants in common with full rights of survivorship, received a Warranty Deed 
on the 3.47 acre parcel, that the true owner of both parcels was her father, Perry Vincent, 
and that her name appeared on the deeds only to protect her father. 
The parties chose to resolve the issue of whether the defendant had an interest in 
the properties by agreeing that whatever interest the defendant did have in the two parcels 
as of the date the plaintiff had filed for divorce, July 6, 1990, would be awarded to the 
plaintiff. Consistent with this resolution, in reference to the two parcels paragraph 12 of the 
Decree of Divorce provided "[specifically, plaintiff is awarded all of the joint interest in the 
said parcels as well as any individual interest of the defendant in the same as of July 1, 
1991." The defendant recognizes her obligation to marshall all evidence that would support 
the trial court's finding that the plaintiff was simply awarded the two parcels of real 
property. There is no evidence that supports that finding. Evidence in addition to the 
Decree supports the defendant's contention that the plaintiff was awarded whatever interest 
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the defendant had in the subject properties. The evidence is the stipulation that was read 
into the record on the issue of the two parcels. The defendant's counsel stated: 
There was some other property which, of course, the defendant has 
claimed was not marital property. It is our agreement that should it be 
determined that there is a marital interest in the property other than the 10.7 
acres and the residential property that it would go completely to the plaintiff 
free and clear of any interest of the defendant. (TT, July 2, 1991; p. 2; 11. 24, 
25; p. 3; 11. 1-5). 
The plaintiffs counsel was provided an opportunity to make any clarifications or 
additions to the stipulation regarding the same two parcels of real property. The plaintiffs 
counsel stated: 
There are, in our view, Judge, two pieces of property, and I want to be 
clear on this one point; two pieces of property in addition to the 10.7 acres 
in North Salt Lake and the marital residence which my client claims there is 
an interest either in himself, the two of them, or in the defendant by herself; 
and it's the agreement between the parties that whatever interest she may 
have in reference to both the individual capacity or as a marital estate would 
be conveyed to my client, if any. (TT, July 2, 1991; p. 4, 1. 25; p. 5, 11. 1-9). 
The evidence demonstrates that the parties had stipulated and the court had ordered 
that the plaintiff would be awarded whatever interest the defendant had as of July 1, 1990 -
not that the plaintiff was specifically awarded the two parcels of real property. Findings of 
Fact #2 that states that the plaintiff was awarded the two parcels of property is clearly 
erroneous. 
POINT 2. THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD 
NEGOTIATED IN BAD FAITH IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the court's findings state, respectively, that: 
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That the defendant agreed to transfer the parties interest in the said 
two parcels as existed in July, 1990, without disclosing to the plaintiff, his 
counsel, defendant counsel nor the Court that she had already transferred all 
of the parties interest two months earlier, to defendant's mother and sister in 
violation of the restraining order that she sought and obtained from the court, 
in August of 1990. (Findings of Fact, 1115). 
That the negotiations by the defendant were therefore not only in bad 
faith, but that the transfer of the subject property to be in direct violation of 
the restraining order obtained by the defendant. (Findings of Fact, 1116). 
The defendant does not dispute that she transferred whatever interest she had in said 
properties subsequent to the entry of the restraining order and prior to the time the parties 
appeared before the court on July 2, 1991. The defendant does take issue with the finding 
that she negotiated in bad faith. The defendant testified at the trial that the properties had 
been titled in her name and in the name of her mother at the instruction of her father; that 
she was not involved in any way in the purchase of the two properties; and that until the 
time that the two properties were transferred, she did not in any way take any actions 
consistent with an ownership interest in either of the properties. The evidence was that the 
defendant did not pay any consideration to obtain an interest in either properties, nor did 
she receive any consideration when the two properties were transferred. The defendant 
testified that during the time she and her mother both held undivided one-half interests in 
the 3.1 acre property, and the time that her mother and she were joint tenants, not tenants 
in common with full rights of survivorship in the 3.47 acre property, that she did not make 
any payments related to the purchase or maintenance of the two properties. 
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The plaintiffs testimony on this subject was consistent with the defendant's. The 
plaintiff testified that regarding the 3.1 acre property, Perry Vincent, the defendant's father, 
negotiated for the purchase of the real property; that Perry Vincent paid the down payment; 
and that the balance of the payments were made by a sand-blasting company. The following 
series of questions and answers between the plaintiff and his counsel provides direct support 
that the defendant was not aware of the status of the subject properties at any time after 
their purchase, including when the parties were negotiating on July 2, 1991. 
Question: I want you to focus on my question in reference to the language 
found in open court. Do you recall there being a time when 
Shauna didn't know what was there and so we phrased it in 
those terms? 
Answer: Sure. 
Question: So we phrased it in those terms? 
Answer: Sure. 
Question: 
Answer: 
Question: 
Answer: 
Tell the court about that quickly, please. 
Well, you know, she was busy doing other things and she didn't really -
- I know we didn't really keep her abreast of any of it. We sat her 
down and said we want you together on the title. Here's a check. And 
we gave them a check, and that's it. 
So Shauna wasn't abreast of things. So when it comes time to 
negotiate this parcel and what, if any interest - "if any" why are saying 
"if any" in the stipulation and in the agreement process, Mr. Costanzo. 
Because I don't think she knew what she had. 
(IT, p. 57, 11. 5-19). 
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The plaintiff argued to the court and the court did find that as the defendant had 
referenced in her Counterclaim and in her Financial Declaration the property in North Salt 
Lake, that she was aware of the status of the 3.1 and 3.47 acre parcels. The difficulty with 
this argument, and with that finding, is that the parties did own other property in North Salt 
Lake consisting of 10.7 acres. The defendant and the plaintiff have always agreed that there 
was a marital interest in the 10.7 acres. There was no evidence that the defendant had 
acknowledged in any way that there was a marital interest in the 3.1 and 3.47 acres. The 
evidence that was offered by the defendant and the plaintiff is consistent that the defendant 
was not involved in the purchase, maintenance, and disposition of the 3.1 and 3.47 acres. 
The defendant could not have negotiated in bad faith regarding the property if she did not 
know what interest she may have had. Even the plaintiff testified that the defendant was 
not aware of the status of the properties; that those issues were kept from her; and that she 
had been acting on behalf of others, including the plaintiff. The fact that the defendant did 
not know what interest she had in the real property prevents a finding of bad faith. 
POINT 3. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
The plaintiff recognizes the general rule that "an award of attorney's fees is 
appropriate only if authorized by statute or contract." Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188 
(Utah 1993) at 198. In the instant case, the court found that the defendant had negotiated 
in bad faith. The defendant further recognizes that under §78-27-56 Utah Code Ann., the 
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court was authorized to award attorney's fees to the plaintiff based on its finding that the 
defendant had negotiated in bad faith. As was argued above, the court's finding that the 
defendant had acted in bad faith was based on the erroneous determination that the 
defendant knew what interest she had in the subject properties. The plaintiff testified that 
the defendant had no knowledge of the status of the properties, and was acting on behalf 
of others, and was in fact not kept abreast of the status of the property. As the finding that 
the defendant was acting in bad faith is erroneous, the award of attorney's fees which 
appears to be based on bad faith becomes improper. 
POINT 4. THE FINDING THAT "THERE IS NO TESTIMONY OR OTHER 
EVIDENCE THAT CONTRADICTED THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY THE 
PLAINTIFF REGARDING THE PARTIES' INTEREST IN THE 3.1 AND 3.47 
ACRE PROPERTIES" IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Paragraph 12 of the Findings of Fact states that: 
There was no testimony or other evidence that contradicted the 
testimony given by the plaintiff, regarding the parties' interest, and therefore 
the Court finds as a matter of law that the 3.1 acres and the 3.47 acres in 
North Salt Lake to be marital property awarded to the plaintiff in the subject 
Decree of Divorce. (Findings of Fact, 1112). 
Regarding the 3.1 acre parcel, the plaintiff testified that (a) at the time the parties 
entered into the stipulation, he believed he owned the 3.1 acre parcel (TT, p. 53,11. 23-25); 
(b) and that by virtue of money and help on a construction project that he provided to Perry 
Vincent, he "in essence" gave Perry Vincent twelve or thirteen thousand dollars by which he 
acquired an ownership interest in the property. 
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The plaintiff also offered the following testimony which contradicts the statements 
set forth above: 
1. That on July 26, 1977, Diane R. Vincent and Shauna V. Costanzo 
designated as buyers, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with Richard and 
Frances Chamberlain (TT, p. 81, 11. 3-14). 
2. That the down payment of $5,500 was paid by Perry Vincent (TT, p. 
82,11. 6-9). 
3. That paragraph 19 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract provided that 
title to the property would be given to the buyers when they had complied with the payment 
provisions of the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
4. That a Warranty Deed conveying to Diane R. Vincent and Shauna V. 
Costanzo, each with a one-half undivided interest in the 3.1 acres, was signed by the sellers 
on December 26, 1977, and recorded with the Davis County Recorder on January 9, 1978. 
5. That the plaintiffs and Perry Vincent's sand-blasting company paid the 
balance owing after the down payment (TT, p. 53, 11. 16-20). 
6. That as a result of plaintiff making payments to Perry Vincent 
regarding a Wyoming property, the purchase price was paid one-half by himself, and one-
half by Perry Vincent (TT, p. 54, 11. 23-25; p. 55, 1 1.). 
The court based its finding of a marital interest in the 3.1 acre property on the 
uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff. This finding ignores the fact that the plaintiff 
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contradicted his own testimony. The plaintiff testified that by virtue of payments that he 
made, and despite the fact that his name does not and never did appear on the title, that 
he owned that property. The problem from a consistency standpoint is that the plaintiff 
admitted that Perry Vincent paid the down payment; and that a company he and Perry 
Vincent had incorporated had really made payments for the rest of the property. 
The plaintiffs testimony is also contradicted by his testimony regarding the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract and the Warranty Deed. The plaintiff testified that the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract entered into on July 26, 1977 provided that a Deed would be given to the 
purchasers when the buyer had tendered all payments pursuant to the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. The plaintiff testified that the Warranty Deed was executed by the sellers on 
December 26, 1977 and recorded on January 9, 1978. 
Regarding the 3.47 acres, the plaintiff testified that in February of 1983, he started 
a company known as "Western States Coating and Painting" and that he needed equipment 
for that business (TT. p. 104, 11. 8-16); that prior to starting, the business was first called 
"Interwest Coating and Painting" (TT p. 104, 11. 22, 23); that he negotiated with Perry 
Vincent for some equipment (TT p. 105,11. 17-25); that as part of his negotiation with Perry 
Vincent, he was going to pay the sellers on the 3.47 property (TT p. 106, 11. 1-5); that a 
Warranty Deed issued from the sellers to Diane Vincent and Shauna V. Costanzo on 
December 11, 1979 and was recorded on December 14, 1979 (TT p. 110, 11. 5-24). The 
plaintiff provided contradictory testimony on whether the property had been paid for on 
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December 11, 1979, stating first that the Warranty Deed was "registered" when the property 
was paid for (TT p. 109, 11. 16-18). As to the plaintiffs claim that he owned the property 
because he had paid for it, the plaintiff also testified that corporate entities, not the plaintiff 
personally, had made payments on the property. 
The court found that there was a marital interest in the property based on the 
uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff. Yet there were the following inconsistencies: 
1. No interest in either of these properties was conveyed to the plaintiff. 
2. The Warranty Deed to the 3.1 acre parcel which was to be conveyed 
when the buyers had fully performed, was conveyed in December of 1977, is contrary to the 
testimony that an arrangement was reached in 1983 between himself and Perry Vincent as 
to payment for the property, and that a company in which he and Perry were involved in 
had made other payments on the property. 
3. The plaintiffs claim that he owned 100% interest in both parties by 
virtue of payments that he made is contradicted by statements the plaintiff made that 
corporate entities in which he was involved with and without Perry Vincent made payments 
on the properties. 
These inconsistencies in the evidence make the court's finding that the plaintiffs 
evidence was uncontradicted clearly erroneous. 
26 
POINT 5. THE COURTS FINDING THAT THERE WAS A MARITAL 
INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUFFICIENT FINDINGS. 
As was set forth above, the court found that: 
There was no testimony or other evidence that contradicted the 
testimony given by the plaintiff regarding the parties' interest, and therefore 
the court finds as a matter of law that the 3.1 acres and the 3.47 acres in 
North Salt Lake to be marital property awarded to the plaintiff in the subject 
Decree of Divorce. (Findings of Fact, 1112). 
This finding, by itself, without other supporting findings, is insufficient. In Butler, 
Crockett & Walsh v. Pinecrest Pipeline, 909 P.2d 225 (Utah 1995), the court held: 
Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues is 
reversible error unless the facts in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, and 
capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment." The findings 
of fact must show that the court's judgment or decree "follows logically from, 
and is supported by, the evidence." The findings "should be sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached. Id. at 23. 
As was argued above, the plaintiff testified in a contradictory manner regarding his 
claim of ownership, and that there was documentary evidence that contradicted the 
defendant's testimony. These contradictions and conflicts prohibit the claim that clearly 
established and uncontroverted facts could only support the judgment. 
The findings do not provide any detail, and do not disclose any of the steps upon 
which the court reached the ultimate factual determination that there was a marital interest 
in the real property. Such subsidiary facts might include (a) whether the court found that 
there was a marital interest when the properties were purchased, and if not, when the 
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marital interest was acquired; (b) whether the court found that Diane Vincent did not have 
an interest, or if she did have an interest, when and how that interest was lost; (c) whether 
Perry Vincent had an interest and if so, when it was lost; (d) how was a marital interest 
acquired; was the marital interest acquired through Shauna Costanzo, or was it through 
David Costanzo; (e) were Diane Vincent and Shauna Costanzo merely holding the 
properties in a constructive trust on behalf of their husbands, or on behalf of David 
Costanzo; (f) if David Costanzo acquired an ownership interest by virtue of payments he 
made, what are the facts that led the court to grant judgment based on the finding that the 
plaintiff had completely owned both of the subject properties; (g) how the marital interest 
was acquired - was it by way of gift through the defendant's father or mother, or was it by 
virtue of payments that the plaintiff made; (h) if the court accepts the testimony of plaintiff 
that ownership of the properties was established through the payments he made, a finding 
as to why ownership interest was not acquired by the corporate entities rather than David 
Costanzo personally; (i) a finding as to how the court determined that the defendant should 
have judgment for the entirety of both properties, if, as the plaintiff testified, that by virtue 
of payments he made, he had made one-half of the payments for the properties. 
As there are no findings explaining how or why the court reached the ultimate factual 
determination that there was a marital interest, the court's finding by itself is insufficient. 
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POINT 6. THE COURT EXCEEDED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE 
PLAINTIFFS PETITION TO MODIFY. 
The long-time standard is that "to obtain a modification of a divorce decree, the 
movant must show a substantial change of circumstances subsequent to the decree, that was 
not originally contemplated within the decree itself." Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249 (Utah 
App. 1989) at 1251. In the instant case, the plaintiff did not allege that there had been a 
change in circumstances. There was no evidence presented at the trial that would support 
a finding of a change in circumstance. Consistently, there was no finding that could arguably 
be interpreted as a determination of a change of circumstances since the entry of the 
Decree. As there was no claim that there had been a change in circumstances; as there had 
been no evidence presented that would support a claim for a change in circumstances; and 
as there was no finding that suggests a change in circumstance, the court's granting of the 
Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce was an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
As the plaintiff did not allege, attempt to prove, or establish a change in 
circumstance; and in that the court did not find a change in circumstance, the court's 
judgment granting the plaintiffs Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce should be reversed. 
Should the court find that the plaintiff did prove a change in circumstances sufficient for the 
lower court to grant the plaintiffs Petition to Modify, the defendant respectfully requests 
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that the court find that the defendant has attacked clearly erroneous findings that are not 
supported by the evidence and reverse the judgment of the district court. 
DATED this 16th day of December, 1996. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID CASTANZO, 
PLAINTIFF, 
V. 
SHAUNA COSTANZO, 
DEFENDANT. 
NO. 904902675DA 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN R. ROKICH, JUDGE 
JULY 2, 1991 
REPORTER'S PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: JOHN WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
3865 SOUTH WASATCH BOULEVARD 
SUITE 202, COVE POINT PLAZA 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84109 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: HARRY CASTON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1200 KENNECOTT BUILDING 
10 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE STEET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84133 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; TUESDAY, JULY, 2, 1991 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
* * * 
(CONTINUING) 
THE COURT: OKAY. PROCEED WITH YOUR 
STIPULATION, THEN. 
MR. CASTON: YOUR HONOR, I BELIEVE WE GOT A 
STIPULATION AND I WILL STATE IT AS FULLY AS I CAN. I'M 
SURE MR. WALSH MAY HAVE SOME CORRECTIONS OR ADDITIONS. 
THE DEFENDANT WILL WITHDRAW HER ANSWER AND 
COUNTERCLAIM AND ALLOW THE COURT TO ENTER A DIVORCE 
BASED ON THE TERMS OF OUR STIPULATION. 
THE DEFENDANT-- THE PLAINTIFF WOULD PAY TO 
THE DEFENDANT THE SUM OF $35,000 PAYABLE $588 MONTH FOR 
A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS, STARTING AUGUST 1ST, 1991. 
$300 A MONTH ALIMONY WHICH IS PERMANENT 
UNLESS, OF COURSE, THE DEFENDANT WERE TO REMARRY, 
COHABITATE OR DISEASE THE PLAINTIFF. 
CHILD SUPPORT WILL BE BASED ON $3500 A MONTH 
AND $1600 A MONTH. 
THE DEFENDANT WOULD RECEIVE FREE AND CLEAR OF 
ANY INTEREST OF THE PLAINTIFF 10.7 ACRES, APPROXIMATELY 
TEN ACRES, OF PROPERTY IN NORTH SALT LAKE. THERE'S 
$2300 OF AN OBLIGATION TO MERRILL R. NORMAN WHO 
PERFORMED AN APPRAISAL IN THIS CASE. THAT WOULD BE 
1 
BORNE BY MY CLIENT, THE DEFENDANT. 
THE PLAINTIFF WILL PAY THE BALANCE OF MY 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. HE HAS INDICATED HE WILL PERSONALLY 
GUARANTEE THAT. I WILL SUPPLY THE PLAINTIFF WITH AN 
AFFIDAVIT AS TO THE TRUENESS AND CORRECTNESS OF WHAT 
LEGAL SERVICES HAVE BEEN PERFORMED, AS WELL AS THE 
MONTHLY BILLING STATEMENTS WHICH WOULD GIVE PROOF AS TO 
WHAT HAS BEEN PAID ON THE ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
ON PERSONAL PROPERTY THE PARTIES WOULD BE 
AWARDED THE PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THEIR POSSESSION, 
THEIR CLOTHES AND PERSONAL EFFECTS WITH THE FOLLOWING 
EXCEPTION. 
THE PLAINTIFF WOULD BE AWARDED THE BEDROOM 
SET AND A GRANDMOTHER CLOCK FOR A PROPERTY OF EQUAL 
VALUE, AND THE EXCEPTION ON THE BEDROOM SET IS THAT MY 
CLIENT MAY RETAIN THE MATTRESS AND BOX SPRINGS. 
THE PLAINTIFF WILL BE AWARDED THE REAL 
PROPERTY— THE BUSINESS KNOWN AS WESTERN STATES 
COATINGS AND PAINTING. THE PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO 
THAT. 
THAT THE DEFENDANT'S FATHER AND THE PLAINTIFF 
WILL REMOVE ANY TIRES THAT ARE PRESENTLY ON THE 
•POINT-SOME-ODD ACRES IN NORTH SALT LAKE. 
THERE WAS SOME OTHER PROPERTY WHICH, OF 
)URSE, THE DEFENDANT HAS CLAIMED WAS NOT MARITAL 
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PROPERTY. IT IS OUR AGREEMENT THAT SHOULD IT BE 
DETERMINED THAT THERE IS A MARITAL INTEREST IN THE 
PROPERTY OTHER THAN THE 10.7 ACRES AND THE RESIDENTIAL 
PROPERTY THAT IT WOULD GO COMPLETELY TO THE PLAINTIFF 
FREE AND CLEAR OF ANY INTEREST OF THE DEFENDANT./ 
THE PLAINTIFF WOULD BE AWARDED WHATEVER 
VEHICLE HE'S DRIVING OR ANY VEHICLE HE HAS. 
THE DEFENDANT WOULD BE AWARDED HER JEWELRY 
AND HER VEHICLE. THE PARTIES HAVE AGREED THAT THE 
DEFENDANT WOULD BE AWARDED THE SOLE CUSTODY OF THE 
PARTIES' MINOR CHILDREN; THAT MY CLIENT IS FIT AND 
PROPER TO BE AWARDED CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN. WE HAVE 
AGREED TO USE THE VISITATION SCHEDULE THAT HAS BEEN 
CIRCULATED BY THE COMMISSIONERS, AND WHICH I BELIEVE 
THE COURT MAY HAVE MADE REFERENCE TO EARLIER IN COUNSEL 
DISCUSSIONS. 
THE COURT: I DID. 
MR. CASTON: THE DEFENDANT— THE PLAINTIFF 
WILL OBTAIN LIFE INSURANCE IN AN AMOUNT TO PAY THE 
BALANCE OF CHILD SUPPORT SHOULD HE DISEASE. 
THE PARTIES WILL MAINTAIN IN EFFECT ANY 
HEALTH, MEDICAL, DENTAL, ACCIDENT INSURANCE THEY HAVE 
ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES' MINOR CHILDREN. THE PARTIES 
TO SPLIT THE COST OF ANY UNCOVERED DENTAL, ORTHODONTIC, 
OR MEDICAL EXPENSES. 
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TO 
OR 
ADD 
TWO, 
TO 
HAVE I LEFT 
THE 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
ANYTHING 
MR. 
STIPULATION? 
WALSH: JUDGE 
AND THEN I NEED TO 
OUT? 
WALSH, DO 
I LET 
TALK 
YOU HAVE ANYTHING 
ME MAKE A CLARIFICATION 
AND MAKE SURE WE'RE IN 
AGREEMENT ON A MATTER. 
THE HOUSE OF THE PARTIES LOCATED AT 1141 
NORTH CAPISTRANO DRIVE HERE IN SALT LAKE WILL BE 
AWARDED COMPLETELY TO THE DEFENDANT HEREIN, ALL RIGHTS, 
TITLE AND INTEREST IN THAT REGARD. THERE IS A MORTGAGE 
ON THAT PIECE OF PROPERTY WHICH MY CLIENT IS LIABLE 
FOR. THE PARTIES ARE AGREEABLE THAT IF AT ANY TIME THE 
DEFENDANT EVER GETS MORE THAN 30 DAYS BEHIND ON THAT, 
OR ANY OTHER PAYMENT FOR WHICH HE IS INDIVIDUALLY OR 
JOINTLY LIABLE STEMMING FROM THIS DIVORCE, HE CAN PAY 
THAT AND SUBTRACT THAT FROM THE CHILD SUPPORT OR 
ALIMONY FOR THE MONTH WHICH HE MAKES THE PAYMENT. 
MR. CASTON: THAT WAS OUR AGREEMENT. 
MR. WALSH: THERE IS AN AMBIGUITY WITH 
REFERENCE TO THE-- WHEN WE SAY EQUAL VALUE, WE'RE NOT 
TALKING EQUAL VALUE OF THE BED SET AND VALUE ONLY WITH 
REFERENCE TO THE CLOCK ONLY. 
MR. CASTON: THAT IS CORRECT. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
MR. WALSH: THERE ARE IN OUR VIEW, JUDGE, TWO | M  
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PIECES OF PROPERTY, AND I WANT TO BE CLEAR ON THIS ONE 
POINT; TWO PIECES OF PROPERTY IN ADDITION TO THE 10.7 
ACRES IN NORTH SALT LAKE AND THE MARITAL RESIDENCE 
WHICH MY CLIENT CLAIMS THERE IS AN INTEREST EITHER IN 
HIMSELF, THE TWO OF THEM, OR IN THE DEFENDANT BY 
HERSELF; AND IT'S THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
THAT WHATEVER INTEREST SHE MAY HAVE IN REFERENCE TO 
BOTH THE INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY OR AS A MARITAL ESTATE 
WOULD BE CONVEYED TO MY CLIENT, IF ANY 
MR. CASTON: AS EXISTED JULY 1ST, 1990. 
MR. WALSH: LAST YEAR, JUDGE, AT THE TIME OF 
FILING THIS ACTION. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. WALSH: ONE LAST THING, JUDGE, IF I 
MIGHT. 
YOUR HONOR, THERE PRESENTLY IS IN EFFECT AN 
ORDER THAT ALLOWS MY CLIENT TO SEE THE CHILDREN EVERY 
WEDNESDAY. THE SCHEDULE THAT YOU HAVE HERE PROVIDES 
EVERY OTHER WEDNESDAY. 
THE COURT: WHATEVER YOU AGREE UPON. THAT'S 
JUST A MINIMUM. 
MR. WALSH: DO YOU HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH 
EVERY WEDNESDAY? 
MR. CASTON: NO. 
MR. WALSH: WE ASK THAT THE CHILDREN BE 
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ALLOWED TO GO TO GRANDMA'S ON FREE DAYS INSTEAD OF 
HAVING TO PAY A BABYSITTER. HISTORICALLY THEY HAVE 
BEEN DOING THAT. 
MR. CASTON: IF THEY CHOSE THAT, FOR SHAUNA 
DOESN'T HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH NOT INCURRING THOSE 
EXPENSES. IT SEEMS LIKE THE CHILDREN DON'T SEEM TO 
WANT TO GO. 
MR. WALSH: THERE'S ONE LAST THING WE 
DISCUSSED IN CHAMBERS, IN REFERENCE TO RESOLVING THE 
CHILD CUSTODY ISSUE WE ASKED FOR SOLE CUSTODY IN OUR 
PLEADINGS. JOINT CUSTODY HAS BEEN DISCUSSED, AND 
BECAUSE OF CERTAIN FINDINGS OF VIOLENCE BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES, THE COURT HAS TAKEN A VIEW WE WOULD NOT ALLOW 
EITHER JOINT CUSTODY OR CUSTODY TO MY CLIENT, THE 
PLAINTIFF. BUT IT HAS BEEN THE COURT'S POSITION THAT 
IF AT ANY TIME, FOR SPURIOUS REASONS, THE DEFENDANT WHO 
IS GRANTED CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN, SHALL INTERFERE 
WITH VISITATION OF THE PLAINTIFF-- A COUPLE OF THE 
FINDINGS, THAT BOTH PARTIES ARE FIT AND PROPER PARENTS 
TO BE GRANTED CUSTODY-- THAT THIS COURT WOULD GRANT AN 
IMMEDIATE SWITCH OF CUSTODY IF THAT EVER HAPPENED. 
THE COURT: I DON'T WANT THESE KIDS TO BE 
USED AS A PAWN, SO IF THERE'S NOT A VALID, LEGITIMATE 
REASON FOR NOT ALLOWING VISITATION, THEN, COME BACK 
BEFORE ME AND I'LL CHANGE CUSTODY, BECAUSE YOU'RE BOTH 
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FIT AND PROPER PEOPLE. 
MR. CASTON: AS THE COURT WILL RECALL, I 
CERTAINLY ARGUED STRENUOUSLY THAT ANY BEHAVIOR HAS 
OCCURRED. A PROBLEM THAT MY CLIENT TALKS ABOUT TO ME 
IS THE FACT THAT THE CHILDREN ARE PICKED UP AT 
DIFFERENT TIMES. 
THE COURT: I'LL TELL YOU, YOU HAVE ABOUT AN 
HOUR LEEWAY ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. I KNOW YOU EACH HAVE 
PLANS, BUT ALLOW YOURSELF AN HOUR. YOU CAN'T MEASURE 
VISITATION IN MINUTES AND SECONDS. SO ALLOW YOURSELF 
SOME LEEWAY AND GET ALONG. AND I'M SURE AFTER THE 
DIVORCE IS GRANTED THINGS WILL SMOOTH OUT. 
MR. WALSH: MY UNDERSTANDING, BASED ON THE 
THINGS THAT I SAID IN CHAMBERS, WE COULD HAVE SUCH 
LANGUAGE IN THE DECREE. 
THE COURT: PUT IT IN THE DECREE SO YOU BOTH 
KNOW. IF YOU DON'T GET THE--
MR. CASTON: I THINK MR. WALSH IS SAYING IT 
WOULD BE AUTOMATIC. 
THE COURT: NO. COME BACK HERE BEFORE ME SO 
I CAN HAVE A HEARING. 
MR. WALSH: AND IF THE COURT FINDS IT 
SPURIOUS--
THE COURT: YES, I CAN HAVE A HEARING. I'M 
NOT GOING TO GRANT IT AUTOMATICALLY. 
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LIMIT THE 
TIME OR 
LEEWAY. 
BUT REMEMBER IT WORKS 
VISITATION 
KEEPS 
MR. 
IF HE 
THEM LONGER. 
CASTON: YOUR 
BOTH WAYS. 
DOESN'T GET THE 
BUT GIVE 
HONOR, WE 
I COULD 
KIDS 
YOURSELF 
WERE 
A 
WORK 
BACK IN 
LITTLE 
ON THE 
OTHER PROBLEMS, SO OBVIOUSLY THIS PORTION IS NOT AS 
SMOQTH AS THE OVER MATTERS WHICH WE WORKED OUT, BUT 
THERE'S A CONCERN THAT MY CLIENT HAS. 
THERE WAS SPECIAL INCIDENT WHERE SOMETHING 
HAPPENED AND WITHOUT GOING INTO THAT AND HAVING THE 
WHOLE THING BLOW UP, IT WOULD BE MY CLIENT'S 
UNDERSTANDING THAT IS THERE IS ONE VISITATION OVER 
WHICH MR. COSTANZO WAS AWAY ON VACATION, AND IF HE'S 
AWAY ON VACATION, I DON'T THINK VISITATION— 
THE COURT: NO. 
MR. CASTON: SHE SHOULD HAVE TO-- I THINK A 
REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE THAT HE SHOULD HAVE TO BE PRESENT 
WITH THE CHILDREN ON VISITATION. 
THE COURT: IF HE'S OUT OF TOWN, IF HE'S OUT 
OF TOWN AND SAYS I'M GOING TO BE GOING TO CALIFORNIA, 
SHE DOESN'T HAVE TO TAKE THE KIDS OVER THERE, DOESN'T 
HAVE TO TURN THEM OVER A SOMEONE ELSE. 
MR. CASTON: WOULD THE APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE 
BE THAT HE MUST BE PRESENT DURING VISITATION? 
THE COURT: THAT HE'S AVAILABLE DURING 
8 
VISITATION. THAT'S ALL, THAT HE'S AVAILABLE. 
MR. WALSH: RIGHT. AND I UNDERSTAND THAT, 
JUDGE, AND I DON'T WANT TO SPLIT HAIRS BECAUSE I AGREE 
THAT ONCE THIS GETS RESOLVED, HOPEFULLY THE PARTIES 
WILL WORK OUT WHAT'S IN THE BEST INTEREST OF CHILDREN. 
THERE'S THIS ONE CONCERN. SOMETIMES HE GETS 
HOME LATE AND PREFERS THAT CHILDREN GO TO GRANDMA'S, 
HIS MOTHER, WHERE THEY GO ANYWAY. THEY WILL STAY LATE 
AT NIGHT, START FIRST THING IN THE MORNING. 
THE COURT: I DON'T SEE ANY PROBLEM WITH THAT 
JUST AS LONG AS HE'S NOT OUT OF STATE OR NOT GOING TO 
BE THERE, AND JUST GIVE THE CHILDREN TO GRANDMA JUST 
FOR THE SAKE OF MAKING HER COMPLY TO VISITATION. WE 
DON'T WANT TO BE PLAYING GAMES WITH EACH OTHER. 
MR. WALSH: NOW IN LIGHT OF ALL THAT HAS BEEN 
SAID AND DONE, DO YOU WANT TO TAKE JURISDICTION AND 
GROUNDS? 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
I, KATHLEEN SCHULTZ, AN OFFICIAL COURT 
REPORTER FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY 
THAT I REPORTED THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER ON JULY 2, 
1991, AND THE TRANSCRIPT PAGES 1 THROUGH 9, INCLUSIVE 
CONTAIN A TRUE AND CORRECT REPORTER'S PARTIAL 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS. 
DATED THIS 25TH DAY OF MARCH, 1992. 
KATHLEEN SCHULTZ, sJs.R. S S
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
HARRY CASTON (4009) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Suite 1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID COSTANZO, 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Plaintiff : 
V. : Civil No. 904902675DA 
SHAUNA COSTANZO, : Judge John R. Rokich 
Defendant : 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on 
Tuesday, July 2, 1991, at the hour 9:30 a.m. before the Honorable 
John R. Rokich, Third District Court Judge. The plaintiff was 
present in person and represented by his counsel, John Walsh. The 
defendant was present in person and represented her by counsel, 
Harry Caston. On March 25, 1992 the parties appeared before the 
Court on the defendant's objections to the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce. The--Court, after 
hearing the stipulation of the parties being read into the record, 
and after taking testimony of the plaintiff, and having ruled on 
the defendant's objections to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
9f Law and Decree of Divorce, and after making and adopting its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and now being fully 
advised in the premises, does hereby 
ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE: 
1. That the plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce 
on the basis of irreconcilable differences and the same is to be 
final upon entry. 
2. That the defendant is hereby awarded the care, custody 
and control of the parties' minor children, subject to liberal and 
meaningful visitation in the plaintiff including, but not limited 
to: 
Friday 6 p.m. - Sunday 6 p.m. Alternate 
Weekends: 
Midweek: 
Holiday: 
Wednesday, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. 
(A) Christmas - non-custodial parent to have 
Christmas day beginning at 1:00 p.m. and 
continuing through 1/2 of the child7s total 
Christmas school vacation. 
(B) Thanksgiving and Easter - non-custodial parent 
to have Thanksgiving in even years (1992, 94, 
etc) ; Thanksgiving holiday is Wednesday 6p.m. 
until Sunday 6:00 p.m. Non-custodial parent 
to have Easter in odd years (1991, 93, 95, 
etc.); Easter holiday is Friday 6 p.m. until 
Sunday 6 p.m. 
(C) Other holidays - New Year's'Day, Martin Luther 
King Day, President's Day, Memorial Day, July 
4th, July 24th, and Labor Day. These are to 
be alternated, with the non-custodial parent 
to have visitation beginning 6 p.m. the day 
before the holiday until 6 p.m. on the 
holiday. 
3 
Fathers Day/ 
Mother/s Dav: 
Birthdays: 
Extended 
Visitation: 
Telephone: 
Holidays take precedence over the weekend 
visitation and no changes should be made to 
the regular rotation of the alternating 
weekend schedule. 
As appropriate, 6 p.m. 
p.m. the day of. 
the day before until 6 
One evening, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. during 
the week of the child's birthday and the non-
custodial parent's birthday. 
(A) Summer - 5 weeks continuous, with written 
notice of dated provided to custodial 
parent by May 1st. Custodial parent to 
have alternate weekends, holiday, and 
phone visitation. 
(B) Year-Round school - two 2 week periods, 
with written notice of dates to custodial 
parent at least 30 days prior to 
visitation. Custodial parent to have 
holiday, and phone visitation. 
(C) Each parent shall be allowed two weeks 
per year uninterrupted possession of the 
children for purposes vacation, provided 
the same does not interfere with holiday 
visitation per above. Each parent shall 
notify the other in writing of such two 
week period at least 30 days in advance. 
Reasonable, before 8 p.m. 
The parties stipulate and agree that on every Friday the minor 
children are to go to the home of Darlene Costanzo; however, the 
wishes of the minor children are to be considered in reference to 
this Friday visitation, further the plaintiff is to be available 
during his visitation. 
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3. Should either party, for spurious reasons, interfere with 
the said visitation, the Court shall, after hearing, switch custody 
of the minor children or limit visitation, as the Court deems 
appropriate. 
4* Plaintiff shall pay the sum of $302.00 per month per 
child for a total child support obligation of $604.00 per month. 
Upon the payment of the same, plaintiff is hereby awarded one of 
the exemptions involving the minor children. Any premiums paid by 
the plaintiff for health, accident, hospitalization, dental, 
orthodontic or eye care insurance shall be subtracted from the said 
$604.00 stated above. Any health of dental care provided the minor 
children, but not paid for by insurance, shall be borne equally by 
the parties. 
5. Plaintiff shall maintain life insurance on his own life 
in a sum equal to the total monthly child support for the minor 
children until each reaches the age of eighteen years of age. 
6. Plaintiff shall pay one-half of any work related child 
care costs, and the defendant shall submit her paystubs to the 
plaintiff. 
7. Plaintiff shall pay the sum of $300.00 as and for alimony 
to the defendant. 
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8. Plaintiff is hereby awarded all of the parties' right, 
title and interest in the business known as Western States Coating 
& Painting, Inc., as his sole and separate property. 
9. Defendant is hereby awarded the parties' home at 1141 
Capistrano Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to the indebtedness 
thereon, and to release, hold harmless and indemnify the plaintiff 
for the same, and at any time should the defendant fall thirty (30) 
days or more late in the payment of the same, the plaintiff at his 
sole discretion may pay the same, and subtract the said monies from 
his monthly child support and/or alimony aforesaid. 
10. Defendant is hereby awarded the 10.7 acres in North Salt 
Lake, and the plaintiff is hereby awarded the other two parcels in 
North Salt Lake. Specifically plaintiff is awarded all of the 
joint interest in the said parcels as well as any individual 
interest of the defendant in the same as of July 1, 1991. 
11. Plaintiff and defendant's father shall jointly and 
equally contribute to the removal of the tires on the said 10.7 
acres. 
12. Plaintiff shall^ pay the sum of $35,000.00 to the 
cfefendant at the rate of $583.00 per month with no interest. The 
plaintiff^  personally guarantees the payment of the same. The 
payments may be made by Western States Coating & Painting. 
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13. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the personal property in his 
possession as well as any clothing or personal effects and gifts as 
well as the complete bedroom set, including: black lacquer queen 
head board, black lacquer seven drawer dresser with mirror, black 
lacquer upright armoire, black lacquer desk with chair, black 
lacquer 2 each two drawer end tables, less the box springs and 
mattress, as well as the Grandmother's clock or of furniture of the 
same value. 
14. iwmdant is hereby awarded the BMW, subject to the 
Indebtedness thereon, and her watch. If at any time she falls 
thirty (30) days or more late in the payments of the same, the 
plaintiff at his sole discretion may pay the same and subtract the 
monies paid from his child support and/or his alimony aforesaid. 
15. Defendant is awarded all other personal property of the 
parties not otherwise awarded to the plaintiff above. 
16. Defendant shall pay, and release, hold harmless and 
indemnify the plaintiff for the remaining balance owed to Merril 
Norman for his appraisal of Western States Coating & Painting, Inc. 
17. Plaintiff shall pay the defendant's attorney's fees in 
the sum of $3,300.00. 
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18. Each party shall cooperate and execute all documents 
necessary to bring about the terms and conditions of the Decree as 
outlined above. 
DATED this day of , 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
JOHN R. ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
John Walsh 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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18. Each party shall cooperate and execute all documents 
necessary to bring about the terms and conditions of the Decree as 
outlined above. 
DATED this day of , 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
JOHN R. ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the ^?S day of QifiirL I , 
1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decrree of Divorce 
was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
John Walsh, Esquire 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
2319 South Foothill Drive 
Suite 270 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
ft^.M.L 
eliz\harry\cstnzo.dod 
JOHN WALSH 
ATTCNREY AT LAW 
SUITE 2 70, 2319 FOOTHILL DR3VE 
SALT IAKE CITY, UTAH 
84109 
Telephone: 467-9700 
IN THE DJSTBICT COURT CF THE THIRI> JUDICIAL MSTRICT 
IN AND FOTi SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE Or UTAH 
-......--. oooooOooooo-
DAVID COSTANZO : VERIFIED PETITION TO MODIFY 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Civil No. 90-490267 5 DA 
SHACNA COSTANZO : 
Defendant. 
..............-oooooOooooo 
Comes now the Plaintiff, David Costanzo, by and through 
his Attorney, John Walsh, and complains and alleges against, the 
above named Defendant, as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff filed for Divorce, on or about 
July 1, 1990. 
2. Shortly thereafter the Court entered an order on 
or about August 27, 1990, prohibiting the parties from jepardizing 
any assets of the: parties without prior Court approval, or .lpproval 
from opposing Counsel. A copy of the same is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A. 
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3. Based upon the foregoing the parties entered into 
a stipulation and agreement, calling for che Plaintiff ro d ceive 
certain properties in North Salt Lake. A copy of the tran.scnpr 
jb read into the record is attached hereto, as Exhibit B. 
4. Notwithstanding the express Court order prohibiting 
the Defendant from selling the property, as well as che express 
agreement made and entered into in open Court, the Defendant has 
soLd che same and taken the benefits of the same as her soLe 
and separate property. A copy of the said Deeds is attached hereto 
as Exhibit C. 
5. That at the time of the stipulation being read into 
the record, the Court found that the property wa,s worth $20,000.00 
(twenty thousand dollars) per aore. 
6. That by virtue of the foregoing the Plaintiff is 
entitled to a judgment against the Defendant in the sum of 
$129,720,00. 
7. That in addition to the foregoing, the Plaintiff 
as awarded one twelve gage^ Browning Shot Gun, as well a?, one 
twelve gage Pemtiintton Shot Gun, together being wcrth about^^/* 
$1,000.00. 
~ 8. Plaintiff hss requested the said gun*, but the Defendant 
has> rtfuyed to gfve them to him> and has apparently given their 
to «• family member. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against the 
above nanw-d Defendant as follows: 
se 
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9. For *.n aware1 tti ct.e sum of $13Q ,72.0 .QQ. 
10. For iriteresc. court cos t s , e tc . 
11. For a reasonable attorneys fees. 
12. For such othtir and additional relief as the Court. 
VERIFICATION 
STAIE OF UTAH ) 
S S • 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE j 
DAVID COSTANZO, being firth duly sworn states that he 
has read the foregoing and understands the same, and states that 
the' same is true and correct to the best of his knowledge, 
information and belief. / K y 
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JOHN WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2319 FOOTHILL DRIVE, SUITE 270 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84109 
Telephone: 467-9700 By. 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 2 9 1996 
SAL I LAAClA/ofr 
V. 4 " f > mr^ OiputyCI«fk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
DAVID COSTANZO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHAUNA COSTANZO, ; Civil No. 904902675DA 
Defendant. ; Judge William B. Bohling 
ooooooOoooooo 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on Tuesday, January 9, 1995, at the hour of 9:30 A.M. before 
the Honorable William Bohling, District Court Judge, with the 
Plaintiff, David Costanzo, appearing in person and represented 
by John Walsh, Attorney at Law, and the Defendant, Shauna Costanzo, 
appearing in person and represented by Harry Caston, of McKay, 
Burton & Thurman, Attorneys at Law, and the Court after hearing 
the testimony of the parties, the exhibits admitted into evidence, 
and then considering the arguments of Counsel, now for good cause 
appearing, does hereby make and adopt the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the parties in the above entitled action were 
divorced on or about November 16, 1992, pursuant to a Decree 
of Divorce entered and executed by the Honorable John Rokich, 
District Court Judge. 
2. That pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, prepared 
by Mr. Harry Caston of McKay, Burton and Thurman, Attorneys 
for Defendant, the Plaintiff David Costanzo, was awarded two 
parcels of property, one of 3.1 acres and another of 3.47 acres 
in North Salt Lake, and the Defendant was awarded a single parcel 
of 10.7 acres in North Salt Lake. 
3. That shortly after the execution of the Decree of 
Divorce by the Court, the Plaintiff signed a deed, conveying 
all of his interest in the 10.7 acres to the Defendant. 
4. That shortly after the complaint was filed for 
Divorce, by the Plaintiff, the Defendant brought a motion for 
a restraining order, restraining the parties from jepardizing 
any assets of the parties without prior Court approval or approval 
of opposing counsel. 
5. Then in December of 1990, contrary to the above 
stated restraining order, the Defendant pawned two shot guns of 
the Plaintiff, which had a reasonable value of $1,000.00 total, 
without either disclosing the same to Plaintiff or otherwise 
obtaining authorization from the Court. 
6. The Court finds that this was a direct violation of 
the said restraining order, and therefore the Plaintiff is 
entitled to a judgment in the sum of $1,000.00 as the fair 
market value of the said shot guns. 
7. That sometime in the month of April, 1991, the 
Defendant signed two warranty deeds conveying her interest 
in the two parcels awarded to Plaintiff, referred to in paragraph 
#2 above, to the Defendant's mother and sister, without either 
disclosing the same to Plaintiff or otherwise obtaining 
authorization from the Court. 
8. The parties stipulated to the appraisal prepared 
by Jerry Webber, as being admitted into evidence, which showed 
the fair market value of the said two parcels in 1994 to be 
$105,200.00. 
9. That the Defendant testified while on the stand 
during cross examination that her original pleadings stated 
that the property in North Salt Lake, should be awarded to the 
Plaintiff and that she be awarded one-half of the value of the same, 
with no mention that the property did not belong to the parties. 
10. That the Defendant testified while on the stand 
during cross examination that her affidavit filed as the 
Financial Declaration of the Defendant, that the property in 
North Salt Lake, should be awarded to the Plaintiff and that she 
be awarded one-half of the value of the same, with no mention that 
the property did not belong to the parties. 
11. The Court finds that the statements made by the 
Defendant that the parties had no interest in the said property, 
is inconsistent with the pleadings filed by the Defendant, and 
inconsistent with the affidavit filed by the Defendant, prior to 
the granting of the subject divorce, and therefore the Court does 
not find her testimony regarding the parties interest in the 
subject property to be credible. 
12. That there was no testimony or other evidence that 
contradicted the testimony given by the Plaintiff, regarding the 
parties interest, and therefore the Court finds as a matter of 
law that the 3.1 acres and the 3.47 acres in North Salt Lake 
to be marital property, awarded to the Plaintiff in the subject 
Decree of Divorce. 
13. That at the time of the stipulation being read 
into the record, the Court finds that the Defendant did not 
even disclose the transfers of the subject property, referred 
to in paragraph #7 above, to her own Attorney, Harry Caston, as 
he stated in open Court that the parties interest was to be 
determined at the time of filing of the Divorce, in July of 1990. 
14. The Court finds that by virtue of the foregoing 
the Defendant did not negotiate in good faith when she agreed 
that the Plaintiff would be entitled to the 3.1 acres and the 
3.47 acres in the North Salt Lake, as of the time of filing of 
the complaint for divorce, when she had already transfered the 
said parcels in April of 1991. 
15. The Court finds that the Defendant agreed to transfer 
the parties interest in the said two parcels as existed in July, 
1990, without disclosing to the Plaintiff, his Counsel, Defendant 
Counsel nor the Court that she had already transferred all of the 
parties interest two months earlier, to Defendant's mother and 
sister in violation of the restraining order that she sought 
and obtained from the Court, in August of 1990. 
16. The finds that the negotiations by the Defendant 
were therefore not only in bad faith, but that the transfer of 
the subject property to be direct violation of the restraining 
order obtained by the Defendant. 
17. The Court finds the fair market value of the two 
parcels of property, of 3.1 acres and 3.47 acres to be $105,200.00. 
18. The Court finds that the pawning of the shot guns 
and the transfer of the two parcels of property to be in direct 
violation of the restraining order of this Court, and therefore 
the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment of $106,200.00 as well as a 
reasonable attorneys fee. 
From the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, the Court now makes 
and adopts the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
19. That the Court has both personal and subject matter 
jurisdiction in this matter. 
20. That the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the 
sum of $106,200.00 (one hundred six thousand two hundred dollars 
and no cents), costs in the amount of $769.75 and a reasonable 
attorneys fee. 
Dated this day of March, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDG 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW to the Defendant, by mailing the same to HARRY CASTON, 
10 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE, 600 KENNECOTT BUILDING, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 
84133, this J^rfday of March, 1996. 
tfALSH 
!Y AT LAW 
